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Abstract
We investigate security of ADS-B system and
propose a framework composed of two solutions that
would require minimal change to the existing system.
The investigation focuses on providing an encrypted
ADS-B system that provides confidentiality,
availability, and integrity while requiring minimal
changes to the existing ADS-B specification. The
proposed framework consisting of two solutions is
envisioned to be implemented through software
updates while providing backwards compatibility. The
most challenging requirement during this study was to
work within the constraints of the existing ADS-B
system.

1. Introduction and Contributions
Automatic
Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B) is planned to be one of the pillars of the Next
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).
ADS-B lacks some capabilities that are essential for
addressing cybersecurity concerns. The missing
properties are source and content authentication,
confidentiality, as well as integrity. The reported work
has usually addressed some of these shortcomings
without much consideration of others. This creates
room for improvement: addressing these shortcomings
collectively and this is where our work becomes
relevant.
The primary goal of this effort has been to
investigate ADS-B security and identify ways in which
the issue of anonymity could be effectively addressed in
the NextGen National Airspace System (NAS). In
addition, we tried to determine whether we could devise
a solution for offering an encrypted ADS-B system.
Such a solution would ideally provide participants
additional confidentiality and privacy, as well as some
degree of message freshness and integrity.
The proposed security framework is envisioned to
require minimal change to the ADS-B specification.
The proposed solution is such that the system will
maintain full backwards-compatibility with existing
aircraft transponders and would require only software
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updates. Backwards compatibility would enable phased
introduction of any solution in case of adoption.
The goal of this paper is not to focus on active
attacks (many researchers have already covered those as
seen in Section 2). This work focuses on addressing
passive attacks to enhance privacy and selective
anonymity against real-time tracking. If the proposed
approach in this paper were to see wide adoption, it
could also help mitigate various active attacks such as
not being able to generate valid broadcasts.

2. Background
2.1. ADS-B Overview
ADS-B is the technology that has been heralded by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other
civil aviation authorities as central to modernizing the
state of airspace management across the globe [9]. It
was chosen in 2005 [9] under the NextGen Air
Transportation System and Single European Sky
programs to improve the accuracy of radar-based traffic
information used by air traffic controllers [22]. Until
recently, controllers have relied on secondary
surveillance radar (SSR) to improve the accuracy of
aircraft identification and tracking. SSR has gone
through a series of evolutions over time, as indicated by
the specific mode supported by a transponder [8].
Growing airspace congestion has necessitated
improvements in the types of data collected, the
accuracy of that data, and the determination of data
measurement error [30]. ADS-B intends to improve on
its SSR predecessors in distinct ways [30]:
1. It is automatic, in the sense that no controller or
pilot action is required to transmit aircraft
information to nearby receivers.
2. It is dependent surveillance, in that the accuracy of
transmitted information is dependent on the
existence of adequate navigational information
onboard the aircraft (e.g. GPS).
3. It is a one-way broadcast in nature, in the sense that
aircraft information is transmitted without a priori
knowledge of who will actually receive it.
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ADS-B provides information not only about aircraft
position and altitude as before, but also with regard to
the identity, velocity, and intent of an aircraft [30]. This
data is transmitted in plaintext, and is made available to
all equipped ground- and air-based participants in an
effort to address airspace congestion concerns, increase
airspace coverage areas, and effectively deal with flight
safety by providing pilots with access to the same
information as controllers [10]. While already mandated
in some other countries, aircraft within the US will not
be required to adopt ADS-B until 2020 for those flights
operating in or around Class A, B, C, and some E
airspaces [3].
ADS-B has been approved for operation on two
separate data links: 978MHz and 1090MHz. The former
is referred to as Universal Access Transceiver (UAT),
and is intended predominantly for use by general
aviation operators. The latter, on the other hand, is
generally referred to as Extended Squitter Mode S
(1090ES), and is intended predominantly for use by
commercial aviation operators. These distinctions
reflect existing regulations already in place within the
U.S., as well as those that the FAA has proposed for
ADS-B equipage requirements in 2020 [3].
ADS-B services can then be further categorized into
ADS-B In and ADS-B Out. ADS-B Out consists of all
functionality pertaining to the automatic broadcast of
aircraft parameters by participants, while ADS-B In
consists of all functionality pertaining to the receipt,
processing, and presentation of this information to
pilots and controllers [2]. Aircraft within the U.S. will
only be required to equip for ADS-B Out [3]; however,
the maximum benefit can be extracted from the system
through the combined use of both components to gain
better situational awareness for pilots.
While ADS-B data links exist on separate
frequencies, probably the most significant difference
between them is the length of messages available to
broadcast the same types of information to nearby
aircraft. For the 1090ES data link, messages are only 14
bytes long [31], while UAT messages can be anywhere
from 18-34 bytes long depending on the payload type
[32]. The UAT link not only provides additional
capacity to that of the already-congested 1090ES
frequency, but also the bandwidth to offer ground-to-air
services [2].
Table 1 shows the standard message format for the
1090ES data link. Since the 1090MHz frequency is
shared with all other legacy SSR systems, an ADS-B
message begins with the declaration of the ADS-B
downlink format number (17). It is then followed by a
description of the Mode S transponder (CA), the
transponder’s 24-bit ICAO address (AA), message
parameters (ME), and parity check bits (PI) [31]. The
limited space available to the ME field requires that

aircraft broadcast several types of ADS-B messages at
varying frequencies to ensure that all required
information is transmitted. As stated by DO-260B, the
“maximum ADS-B message transmission rate [for an
aircraft] shall not exceed 6.2 transmitted messages per
second” [31]. These message types include [31]:
1. Airborne Position
2. Surface Position
3. Aircraft Identification and Category
4. Airborne Velocity
5. Aircraft Status (e.g. TCAS, emergency, priority)
6. Target State and Status
7. Aircraft Operational Status
Table 1. 1090ES ADS-B Message format [8]
1–5
6–8 9–32 33–88 89–112
Bit #
DF=17 CA
AA
ME
PI
Field
|5|
|3|
|24|
|56|
|24|
|Size|
By allowing for variable message lengths, UAT
participants can reduce the number of messages
broadcast, while still transmitting the same types of
information as on 1090ES. A breakdown of the
standard message format and individual message fields
for UAT will not be discussed here, and we direct the
reader to consult [32] for additional information.
In order to bridge the communication barrier
between the two ADS-B data links, the Automatic
Dependent Surveillance – Rebroadcast (ADS-R)
service takes the information from each frequency and
retransmits it on the other [2]. This allows each aircraft
participant to not only see the aircraft that share the
same data link, but also those that use the other one.
The FAA also operates two other services at this time
[2], the details of which are outlined extensively in
[11]:
1. Flight Information Service – Broadcast (FIS-B):
provides UAT-equipped aircraft with weather (text
and graphics), NOTAMs, and ATIS [30].
2. Traffic Information Service – Broadcast (TIS-B):
provides all aircraft with information on the
approximate position, velocity, and altitude of
traffic that are not equipped with ADS-B
compatible transponders.

2.2. Previous ADS-B Security Analyses
General Aviation Manufacturers Association
(GAMA) stated the following in its report:
“General aviation operators are concerned about
potential privacy and security implications resulting
from equipping their aircraft with ADS-B. … The core
concern of the operator community is real-time
tracking of the geographic location of a specific
aircraft” [24].
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In response to this and other similar concerns, the
FAA working group issued the following remark:
“[We have] determined that equipping aircraft with
ADS-B does not materially change the ability to track
aircraft, because aircraft that currently operate with a
Mode S transponder already transmit their ICAO 24-bit
code” [3].
The working group was correct to point out that
Mode S has already been broadcasting an aircraft’s
ICAO code for decades [33]. However, we believe the
increased availability of technology and its impact on
the privacy and security of this system requires further
consideration. For example, it is trivial to lookup the
ICAO code for a specific aircraft [12] online and even
download the entire US aircraft registry [13]. Similarly,
the decreasing cost of radio electronics has allowed
websites such as FlightAware [19] and FlightRadar24
[20] to amass online tracking data by relying on a
community of enthusiasts to set up their own ADS-B
receivers and upload the information in real-time.
The plaintext nature of ADS-B lends itself to attacks
of two kinds: passive and active. Passive attacks
generally “rely on the knowledge derived by
eavesdropping on ADS-B messages” [37]. For instance,
long-term data collection in a given area might allow
someone to come up with statistical models about
destinations, delays, or fleets for not only their own
business activities, but also to learn about those
belonging to their competitors [37, 34]. These
researchers in [37] even discovered that with a single,
low-cost receiver, they could receive messages from up
to 450km away and track aircraft on average for 10
minutes. Similarly, research in [39] describes a range of
attacks against ADS-B system. The researchers in [21]
present threat scenarios against NextGen ATC
including the ADS-B concerns.
On the other hand, active attacks can “result in
severe threats to air traffic safety, including attacks on
air traffic monitors and automated assisting systems like
traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) and pilots”
[37]. Generally speaking, most research in the area
seems to agree that these types of attacks can be
categorized as [35]:
1. Disruption of GPS readings
2. Wireless
jamming
of
surveillance-related
communications
3. Manipulation of ADS-B transmissions [28, 40]
a.
Message Injection (target ghost injection,
flooding)
b. Message Deletion (aircraft obfuscation)
c.
Message
Modification
(trajectory
modification, aircraft impersonation)
Air traffic controllers are oftentimes able to utilize
techniques such as multilateration [35] or even fuzzy
mathematics in data fusion algorithms [16] to protect

against most attacks that manipulate ADS-B
communications. However, the mobile nature of an
ADS-B network between any set of aircraft makes these
approaches irrelevant when it comes to verifying data
received by a single aircraft. It is here where security
efforts need to focus, developing solutions that are not
only quick and resource-efficient, but that can also deal
with aircraft interactions that may only ever last several
seconds [35].
Simple techniques like authentication, encryption,
and hashing would be able to mitigate a lot of the issues
facing ADS-B at this time; however, the consensus is
that the “key distribution and management involved in
[such] solutions would overwhelm the aviation
industry” [28], and the message size constraints of the
data links make most popular solutions to these
problems undesirable or even infeasible [40].
2.2.1. ADS-B Message Encryption and Integrity
It remains a difficult problem to implement
solutions that would validate and protect message
contents without making changes to the data link
specification. Limited bandwidth and message size are
often the reason the research in this area is small,
particularly with respect to 1090ES [40]. Most hashing
algorithms for message integrity require space that does
not exist in a message, while the key distribution
problem on a congested, dynamic channel and the nonstandard ADS-B message length is crippling for the
purposes of encryption [1]. A proposal has been put
forward by United Airlines to utilize 8 Phase-Shift
Keying to expand the bandwidth of the ADS-B data
link to alleviate some of these issues; however, any
such changes are not expected for adoption anytime in
the immediate future [24].
Given the constraints of the ADS-B system, the
consensus amongst researchers is that symmetric block
algorithms are the best choice when it comes to
encryption [1]. In order to employ an “open” ADS-B
network with asymmetric encryption, aircraft would
have to be able to identify their neighbors, somehow
obtain the necessary public keys, and then transmit a
message several times encrypted with the public key for
each neighboring aircraft [17]. This process would
severely reduce the rate of information flow between
aircraft on the same ADS-B data link [17]. On the other
hand, use of symmetric encryption would be faster if
every aircraft knew the shared encryption key for a
given area [17].
The majority of solutions proposed for ADS-B
suggest use of encryption for ensuring message
integrity. Researchers proposed provisioning secret
encryption keys for each aircraft [1, 25, 36]. These
research efforts offer little value to ADS-B airborne
participants for message verification, and further
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emphasize the need for new approaches that allow all
participants to check transmissions before processing.
A solution proposed for message integrity in [25]
was that for a series of six consecutive messages, a
hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) of
128 bits be determined and split across these messages
within the PI field. Another solution to integrity
included retroactive key publication through the
μTESLA authentication protocol, which sends an
encrypted message authentication code (MAC) with
each transmission. The key used to generate these
MACs is then periodically transmitted to all neighbors,
which can then be used to decrypt them and verify that
the message source has been constant over the past time
interval(s) [40]. In both of these cases and in [36],
supporting message integrity, changes to the ADS-B
specification would have been required. Even if this
were not the case, the assumption that no messages
would be lost during transmission is not realistic. The
likelihood of message collision on ADS-B data links
quickly increases with higher traffic densities [40].
2.2.2. Other Privacy Proposals
Aside from some of these more technically oriented
solutions to security and privacy concerns with ADS-B,
GAMA also proposed a number of alternatives that
could be utilized in the short-term [24]:
1. Private FAA Aircraft Registry: Making parts
or all of the aircraft registry private would make it
difficult to associate an aircraft to its owner. The
problem is that the existing registry can be downloaded
[13]. In addition, there are legal commitments imposed
by the Freedom of Information Act exemptions and the
Cape Town Convention (which established the
International Aircraft Registry) [24].
2. Anonymity Mode for 1090ES: UAT provides
an anonymity mode that can be utilized by pilots who
operate under visual flight conditions and do not wish
to utilize ATC services [15]. However, the 1090ES data
link does not provide such a feature. Presumably, this is
due to the fact that the target users of this link (e.g.
commercial operators) require the use of ATC services
during normal operations [24].
3. Aircraft Registry Privacy Office: aircraft
ICAO codes are publicly available online and can be
mathematically computed solely from the knowledge of
a tail number. Much as in the manner that military
aircraft can be issued arbitrary ICAO codes by a
Department of Defense office, GAMA has proposed
that the FAA provide a system by which operators
could request the dynamic assignment of ICAO codes
at will from a designated pool of reserved addresses
[24].
There are valid concerns in [34, 15] that there needs
to be a way in which any arbitrary ICAO code can still
be traced back to a specific aircraft. For instance, ATC

services can only be administered to aircraft whose
identity is known, while search and rescue efforts could
be significantly hindered if nothing is known about the
aircraft itself [15]. Also, if ICAO codes are selfassigned as performed in the UAT anonymity mode,
there is no longer a guarantee that these codes will be
unique among aircraft [34]. A solution is needed that
hides the identity of an aircraft operator from everyone
except those organizations that are legally entitled to
that information (e.g. FAA, government agencies).

2.3. Related Concepts
In order to properly understand some aspects of the
framework presented in this paper, the reader will find
it helpful to be familiar with some related concepts.
Due to space constraints in this paper, we will refrain
from going into too much detail; however, we urge the
reader to consult the following resources for
information on these topics:
1. Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications
System (AeroMACS): [5, 23, 26, 27, 29]
2. Resurrecting Duckling Paradigm: [38]

3. ADS-B Privacy Framework Proposal
3.1. Goals
At his Blackhat presentation in 2012, Andrei Costin
of the Institut Eurécom described the ADS-B protocol
as “all R/W with ‘Guest as Admin’ enabled” [6]. In
addition to highlighting many of the issues already
discussed in Section 2, he identified what he termed the
dominant threats to the ADS-B system [6]:
1. Entity / Message Authentication
2. Entity Authorization (e.g. medium access)
3. Entity Temporary Identifiers / Privacy
4. Message Integrity (HMAC)
5. Message Freshness (non-replay)
6. Encryption (message secrecy)
Few efforts have simultaneously addressed most or
all of these issues. Usually when a solution is proposed
for an issue, it conflicts with some other issue on this
list. Therefore, the primary goal for this work was to
investigate the solutions already proposed for ADS-B
security and adapt them into a form that is more widely
functional and deployable into existing ADS-B rollouts.
A secondary goal was to determine whether an effective
solution could be prescribed for offering an encrypted
ADS-B system in the short term.
A self-imposed constraint on our research direction
was to develop a security framework that would require
minimal change to the ADS-B specification. In this
way, the proposed solution would maintain full
backwards-compatibility
with
existing
aircraft
transponders and would require only software updates.
This also means that these changes, if adopted, could be
gradually phased into service across the nation and be
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simultaneously administered
infrastructure and protocols.

with

any

existing

3.2. Anonymity
The fragmentation of ADS-B support across two
data links has introduced a fundamental discrepancy in
the length of messages supported by any ADS-B
participant. For UAT, message payloads can vary in
length from anywhere between 18 and 34 bytes [32],
while 1090ES message payloads can only be 7 bytes
(ignoring the space allocated for aircraft identity) [31].
Despite this, message source identity is established as a
single 24-bit address in both ADS-B links. Typically,
this value is the ICAO code for an aircraft. There are
two factors that need to be kept in mind:
1. While not all UAT participants broadcast their tail
number in message transmissions, 1090ES
participants always do [31]. The plaintext nature of
ADS-B broadcasts allows an attacker to decode
and positively correlate a specific tail number to an
ICAO transponder ID.
2. Even if ADS-B messages didn’t transmit an aircraft
tail number, the FAA provides public online and
offline access to the US aircraft registry that
contains all ICAO codes [12, 13]. This means that
attackers can directly look up, or reverse-look up
an aircraft from an ICAO code.
While anonymity is not a requirement for
commercial airlines, those in general and corporate
aviation tend to be more sensitive to lack of privacy.
Such information could be very easily exploited via
corporate espionage schemes that mine historical and
live data for any trend that indicates the types of
activities a competitor might be undertaking [34, 37].
So while there is more pressing demand for a resolution
in the 1090ES link, any solution to this problem should
be directly applied to UAT as well.
The UAT specification already provides a
mechanism for pilots to achieve a form of pseudoanonymity. As per DO-282B, there are two methods of
achieving this [32]:
1. For those aircraft with an available aircraft ICAO
code, a temporary identifier can be generated by
XOR’ing the permanent aircraft code with the
concatenated least significant 12-bits of the
aircraft’s latitude and longitude at the time this
operation is selected.
2. For those aircraft without an available aircraft
ICAO code, the time of day is used in place of the
aircraft ICAO code for the operation performed in
Method 1.
There are a couple of issues with this proposed
mechanism for UAT anonymity. The first issue is that
there is no guarantee that an anonymous aircraft code is

unique. A self-assigned temporary aircraft code could
collide with that of another aircraft. The second
problem is aircraft tend to either operate with fairly
predictable travel patterns or are based at a specific
airport(s). This means that both approaches to
determining a temporary address in UAT can be bruteforced by an attacker.
The general consensus in the private sector seems to
be that the FAA should allocate a pool of aircraft codes
that can be randomly allocated when anonymity is
needed [24]. However, there has been no effective
provisioning policy discussed for how the FAA should
address the following issues in the context of
anonymous IDs:
1. Establishing the identity of the originator for an
anonymous aircraft code request.
2. The duration for which the anonymous aircraft code
is valid.
3. Mechanisms for ATC to resolve an anonymous
flight to a real aircraft registration.
The process of identity establishment can include:
1. The pairing of the aircraft with a personal device or
electronic flight bag that is capable of connecting
to FAA systems via cellular, Wi-Fi, satellite,
AeroMACS, or CPDLC networks. The aircraft
should “imprint” on the device (using resurrecting
duckling paradigm), such that it will only ever
respond to interactions with this device [38]. Since
it is the communications gateway for all privacy
requests to the FAA, it must be onboard the aircraft
whenever in use.
2. The generation of a private-public key pair for the
aircraft, of which the private key is stored onboard
the aircraft and the public key is stored in a private
FAA database. This establishes a trusted aircraft
identity that can be used when handling requests
for anonymous IDs or key schedules.
3. The generation of a binary ‘case mask’ for the
aircraft, which is stored in a private FAA database
and onboard the aircraft.
The assumption is that the FAA and its designated
agents can be trusted to perform the association process
stated in item 1 with the strictest of standards and
integrity. It is also assumed that in case imprinting or
the imprinted device fails, the aircraft can switch to its
actual ICAO code. Optionally, the establishment of a
power-on password would ensure that no cockpit
equipment can be initialized unless the credential holder
or trusted individual is present.
A secure connection needs to be established
between the aircraft pilot and FAA systems to enable
the identity establishment process to take place. We
assume that any request shall be processed after engine
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startup and cockpit equipment initialization, but before
the transponder is activated. We believe that this
process could be handled automatically by the onboard
aircraft systems, if the pilot sets some default
configuration to anonymous and/or encrypted mode.
The process of requesting an anonymous aircraft
code from the FAA might look something like the
following from the perspective of an aircraft:
1. Upon selection of anonymous mode, the aircraft
establishes a secure connection to the FAA over its
IP-enabled communication link.
2. The aircraft transmits an encrypted (symmetric)
payload encrypted signed with its private key. The
payload consists of:
a. Actual aircraft tail number and ICAO aircraft
code.
b. ADS-B type (UAT or 1090ES), as this is
needed to determine the length of the
symmetric key required to obfuscate the true
aircraft identity in all messages.
c. A “registrant string”, consisting of the publiclyavailable owner and address from the FAA
aircraft registration record XOR’ed with the
aircraft’s case mask.
d. Estimated flight time to next full-stop
destination.
3. If this payload is properly decrypted and validated
against known aircraft records, the FAA will
provision an anonymous aircraft code and
symmetric key to the requesting aircraft.
4. The aircraft receives the temporary aircraft code, an
expiry time, and an encryption key. It then instructs
the transponder to activate with the provided
aircraft code, and use the encryption key to hide
the message type (1090ES) or message field
(UAT) that contains aircraft identification
information.
Upon full-stop arrival at the intended destination
and once the aircraft is parked, the onboard systems
shall disable the transponder and inform the FAA that
the temporary aircraft code can be released back into
the pool. If the code expires before the aircraft makes it
to the destination, the FAA shall automatically release it
back to the available pool and the aircraft will
reconfigure the transponder to use the aircraft ICAO
code for the remainder of the flight. Any onboard
TCAS systems should use the temporary aircraft code
when available, but the Emergency Locator Transmitter
(ELT) system should always use the aircraft ICAO code
since it is intended only for operation during an
emergency.
To clarify what exactly constitutes the registrant
string, let us assume that we are using the aircraft with
tail number N106ER to request an anonymous ID. The
registration information can be retrieved online at [12].

The case mask shall be 146-bits in length. This is
determined by the maximum space permitted for each
of the registration fields used in assembling this
registrant string, as indicated in documentation
available at [13]. This concept of the case mask
borrows from DNS forgery resilience research [7] to
establish reasonable assurances that communication is
occurring between the intended parties, particularly
when that interaction is predicated on easily accessible,
public information.
For this example, let us assume that the case mask
assigned at aircraft delivery was:
010110101111101100010001010010110010011011
001000101011010100111001011001100011111111
000101111111100001011011011001100111001110
01111010001111110101
First, we must generate the string that will be used
in the XOR operation with the case mask. As shown
below, it consists of the comma-separated
concatenation of the registrant’s name, street, city, state,
and zip code. The end of the record is indicated by a
period, and padded with any character to achieve a
string of the maximum record length to assist in
preventing brute-force attacks on particularly short
aircraft records. Here, we only use the letter ‘a’ for
simplicity.
EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL
UNIVERSITY,600 S CLYDE MORRIS
BLVD,DAYTONA
BEACH,FL,32114.AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Then if we XOR the string above (x) with the case
mask (c) as in x⊕ c, we will get the final registrant
string that is transmitted along with the official request
to the FAA. This XOR operation permutes the case of
each letter in the string (e.g. a⊕ 0=a, a⊕ 1=A). While
the researchers in [7] didn’t account for manipulation of
numbers or symbols in their paper, rules could easily be
defined for these characters to further validate that the
correct case mask is being used (e.g. x⊕ 0=x, x⊕
1=(x+1) mod 10 for numbers).
Note that the field delimiters imposed on the
registrant string are not part of this XOR operation, and
we assume that we are using nonprescribed XOR rules
for numbers and punctuation for the final output:
eMbRY-RiDDLE aERonaUticAl unIvERsiTy,600 S
clYde MoRrIS BlVd,dAYTonA BEacH,Fl,32114.
AAAAAaaaAaAAAAAAAAaaaaAaAAaAAaAAaa
AAaaAAAaaAAAaaAAAAaAaaaAAAAAAaAaA
For this example, we assumed that the case mask is
unchanged over the lifetime of the aircraft. But, it is
also possible that this element could be implemented in
such a manner to provide a rotating, time-based case
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mask to prevent against further tampering, brute-force,
or replay attacks.

3.3. Encryption
Our secondary goal was to determine if there was an
effective solution for encrypting all ADS-B links to
provide additional confidentiality and privacy to
participants, as well as to ensure some degree of
message freshness and integrity checks. This proves
much more difficult to implement, especially when
considering the significant difference in space available
to messages in the 1090ES and UAT links. Since UAT
provides much more space and flexibility in its message
format specification, most research efforts have
oriented themselves around that link, almost completely
ignoring the 1090ES link where such functionality
would be much more desirable. Hence, we take a
complementary approach and place emphasis on the
more-constrained 1090ES link as our discussion can
easily be extended to UAT. We also assume that any
encrypted data links will implement crossover support
via ADS-R for encrypted 1090ES traffic to see
encrypted UAT traffic, and vice versa.
Bandwidth and resource limitations do not leave
much room to utilize asymmetric encryption for
encrypting ADS-B traffic. Therefore, symmetric
encryption method with format-preserving properties is
considered the best approach right now [17].
Researchers at the Air Force Institute of Technology
determined that an encryption method named FFX-A2
[4] (for which NIST standardization is still pending)
would provide sufficient entropy for the ADS-B
1090ES system, despite the number of fixed bits for any
individual aircraft and its short message length [18].
However, this study left the issue of key distribution
largely untouched, merely assuming that a CPDLC data
link would serve the needs of key distribution for all
aircraft [18].
While the CPDLC data link is certainly a viable
option for key distribution, not all aircraft are
configured with the necessary equipment to solely rely
on this type of en route communication data link. We
will describe an alternative that balances link
encryption with data openness. Note that our previous
approach for aircraft anonymization is fully
interoperable with this idea.
A request to operate under encrypted ADS-B
conditions must be approved by the FAA, and should
be carried out in a manner almost identical to the
process for securely carrying out authenticated requests
between the aircraft and FAA systems described earlier.
The request type must be differentiated and additional
payload parameters would be required. A two-step
process is need to obtain the keys required to participate
in the encrypted link.

The aircraft performs the first step before taxi
clearance is given, and is meant to obtain pre-clearance
approval from the FAA to participate in the encrypted
link. In addition to all parameters transmitted with an
FAA request from above for aircraft anonymization in
Step 2, the request for access to the encrypted data link
would also include information about the flight path
and any alternative routes identified due to forecasted
weather along the route. Even if an aircraft encryption
request is approved, no keys will be issued now. The
concern is that somebody might try to gain access to
encrypted transmissions by stating their intent to
participate and receiving their key schedule for the
route, but then not take off. So, there needs to be
verification that the aircraft has indeed taken-off before
the keys are transmitted to the aircraft.
The second step is key distribution, and this might
be handled in one of two ways depending on the airport
from which an aircraft is taking off. If departing from a
controlled airport, the keys can be securely transmitted
over the encrypted communication link between the
FAA systems and the aircraft upon delivery of takeoff
clearance or roll. However if departing from an
uncontrolled airport, the keys can be transmitted to the
aircraft over the same link upon confirmation of radar
contact or successful ADS-B signal multilateration
from a nearby ATC, Air Route Traffic Control Centers
(ARTCC), or ground facility (within no more than 10
minutes after takeoff). We assume that if an aircraft
takes off without successfully obtaining a key schedule,
it must either deviate from its flight plan to achieve
connectivity with the FAA systems or simply continue
its flight in an unencrypted ADS-B mode.
The NAS is divided into several zones, named
ARTCC, which are meant to handle all aircraft en route
through a given geographical region. A map of the US
with these zones depicted can be seen at [14].
We propose a system whereby each ARTCC zone
maintains its own encrypted ADS-B network of air and
ground participants, as inspired by concepts presented
in [17] and [25]. Each ARTCC zone will impose a
universal zone symmetric encryption key KZ,T on its
ground stations for zone Z and time period T, which
will change every hour. The rotation of this universal
zone key will prevent aircrafts from overstaying their
presence in an encrypted link, as well as localize the
extent to which key compromise can affect
communications on the ADS-B link. This key, KZ,T, is
distributed to all approved encrypted link participants at
the time of the original request, whose reported route
will cross into the zone for the specified time period.
We assume that there is some mechanism by which
these keys can be pre-determined and obtained by FAA
systems for distribution in advance, such that aircraft
will already have them onboard when needed. We will
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also assume that these keys will be stored onboard the
aircraft in such a manner that it is impractical to access
by an attacker before their eventual expiration.
In addition to this universal zone key, KZ,T, each
zone will have a key used to encrypt all ADS-B traffic
that changes every 15 minutes. This key is defined as
KQ for that quarter Q of the hour. Ground stations in the
zone shall continuously transmit this key every 5
seconds in a specially marked ADS-B message that is
encrypted by the current ARTCC zone key as follows:
{KQ}Kz,t. Knowledge of the universal zone key KZ,T
allows authorized ADS-B participants to obtain the
correct key KQ.
The authors of [18] proposed that the parity field of
an ADS-B message also be encrypted for message
integrity purposes; however, in the interest of
maintaining backwards compatibility with older ADS-B
transponders, our security framework does not observe
this.
Since the confidentiality of the encrypted ADS-B
link depends on the secure transmission of the key KQ,
we propose that KQ be constructed such that the
integrity of the message source can be validated. In
other words, we need to ensure that we are not
receiving a spoofed encryption key announcement. Let
us define the following operations:
1. The ‘:’ (colon) character defines the concatenation
operation.
2. LEN(s) defines the function that returns the length
(in bits) of parameter ‘s’.
3. HMAC(x,y) defines the cryptographic hash function
that calculates the MAC for ‘x’ in conjunction with
secret key ‘y’.
4. SN defines a binary data string of ‘n’-bits.
We can then define KQ such that:
KQ = SN : HMAC(SN, KZ, T),
where LEN(KQ) = 80 bits.
By using this approach to encryption, we would
maintain the openness of ADS-B broadcast data within
the encrypted link. It also ensures aircraft are bounded
upwards of 1 hour, during which they could potentially
still overhear any encrypted communications in that
area. The selection of these time frames was arbitrary,
and further modification of these time parameters could
be performed to balance system performance with
limiting access control, based on experimental testing
or simulation.
One could argue that a known plaintext attack is
possible in this network configuration. While it is
theoretically possible that an attacker could modify an
aircraft to obtain the ADS-B message contents prior to
encryption and then use a portable receiver to collect
the network traffic, it will prove difficult to correlate an
encrypted message to an aircraft since the aircraft

identifier field is also encrypted. Even if someone
managed to figure out the pairing between plaintext and
ciphertext in the ADS-B traffic, it would still be
infeasible to perform the attack in the amount of time
needed to manipulate communications. If we assume
that some machine onboard the aircraft can generate
1018 ciphertexts each second and that the encryption
key is 80-bits, it would take nearly 7 days to get a
useful result. It is far more likely that improper
handling of the secure communication channel with the
FAA would be the weakest link to attack before the
brute-force approach becomes feasible.
A challenge with the proposed encryption approach
is if an aircraft encounters unexpected weather,
emergency, or delays along the flight path. For aircraft
with available en route communication links, the reason
for delay can be recorded and updated keys could be
issued to extend access to an ARTCC zone or to allow
entry into additional zones. As an alternative for those
aircraft without the necessary hardware, it might be
possible to declare any possible delays or deviations in
addition to the intended flight plan, so that these keys
are issued at takeoff as well. Obviously, this is less
desirable from a security standpoint, but it would be
more practical than forcing these participants to lower
altitudes or to even land at an airport to establish a new
communication channel.
We expect that the implementation of encryption on
top of the existing ADS-B specification will require
some means of differentiating messages transmitted
from aircraft operating under these conditions. This
would be especially true if encrypted and unencrypted
ADS-B links are operated simultaneously with one
another, which is a reasonable assumption given the
phased introduction of aviation technologies in the past.
Encryption will obfuscate the content in the aircraft
address and payload fields, resulting in content that
might not make sense when processed by an aircraft
without encryption capabilities. Therefore, there must
be an easy way for the aircraft to differentiate between
these categories of messages within the same ADS-B
link.
Looking at the breakdown of 1090ES message
fields in Table 1, the downlink format (DF) and Mode S
transponder capabilities (CA) fields are the most likely
candidates for this purpose. Upon review of DO-181E,
it became quickly apparent that repurposing the CA
field bits would interfere with our intent to maintain
backwards compatibility with TCAS [33]. However, the
specification also indicated that of the 25 allocated
downlink format numbers, only 12 have been officially
provisioned and 13 are still available for alternative
purposes [33]. 1090ES ADS-B currently utilizes two
downlink formats: 17 (airborne participants) and 18
(ground participants) [31]. An additional two downlink
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formats can be drawn from this pool of available
numbers to distinguish encrypted messages from
unencrypted ones, while still using the same underlying
message format specification.
This is the most desirable solution for this problem,
as it will require no software upgrade to those aircraft
that do not intend to participate in encrypted data links.
Their equipment will simply see the new downlink
format and ignore it, because the format was not
provisioned in the DO-181 specification version used at
that time to write the software. However, this does
mean that while all aircraft participating in an encrypted
link will be able to see the unencrypted transmissions,
the reverse will not necessarily be true. Future
investigation will be required in this area to see if that
gap could be bridged without giving the illusion that
there are twice as many aircraft in the sky as compared
to the actual airspace.
There is another potential problem with the
encryption method discussed above when operating
near ARTCC zone boundaries. Specifically, an aircraft
encrypts its ADS-B transmissions using the encryption
key for the zone that it is currently flying over.
However, if another aircraft across the border of a zone
received that message, it would not be able to know
which encryption key to use to process the contents.
This degrades the integrity and quality of information
received over an encrypted data link in this scenario,
and represents another area of future research to see if a
solution might be devised. For instance, if the capability
field in the 1090ES message could be repurposed,
aircraft could use graph coloring of ARTCC regions in
the US to encode which zone’s encryption key was
used to encrypt the message in conjunction with the
aircraft’s current location.

controllers and agencies to positively identify these
aircraft while en route. The previous research efforts
that offer anonymity in using ADS-B have focused on
devising their solutions for UAT, which provides much
more space and flexibility in its message format
specification. Because any proposed solution needs to
work for both UAT and 1090ES, we devised our
solution for the more constrained 1090ES link. Our
solution easily extends to UAT.
The second solution dealt with the issue of
encrypting the ADS-B data link. The solution described
a method of separating the NAS into individual
encrypted regions that coincide with existing ARTCC
areas, and managing key distribution in each of these
zones to maintain the principle of ADS-B situational
openness between encrypted participants.
It is yet to be determined whether the security
framework outlined within this paper is the “best”
approach for addressing anonymity and encryption
issues in ADS-B. Further analysis and auditing of the
underlying methods and processes are required.

4. Conclusion

[3]

At the onset of this work, we sought to develop
effective and practical solutions to the issues of privacy
and security within the ADS-B protocol. In addition to
this, we also sought to minimize the number of changes
required to the specification itself in order to maximize
the number of aircraft that will be capable of taking
advantage of the benefits provided by these proposed
improvements. It remains to be a challenge to come up
with a solution that would balance between addressing
the relevant issues.
We proposed an ADS-B security framework
composed of two solutions. The first solution dealt with
the issue of anonymity. The solution outlined a process
whereby the identity of the operator requesting a
temporary aircraft code could be verified, and how
these codes could be provisioned and managed by civil
aviation authorities to offer operators environmental
and proximal privacy, while maintaining the ability of
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